The Father then filed a Rule 59 motion. The trial court granted the motion and reversed itself. The Supreme Court reversed the reversal on the grounds that once the trial court rules, it cannot simply change its mind without meeting the specific (and rather narrrow) grounds in Rule 59.

The trial court purported to rely upon Paternity of Adam, 273 Mont. 351 903 P2d. 207 (1995). Like Adam, the trial court refused to declare that Father had a father/child relationship. Unlike Adam, it actually made a specific finding that Father was father. It is instructive to read the relevant paragraph in Adam:

“Through the mother’s stipulation that Bob was Adam’s father, the statutory presumptions in favor of John as the biological father were rebutted. However, as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr, that biological determination merely sets the stage for the next question: Is it in the best interest of Adam to judicially declare the father/child relationship and thereby grant Bob the prerogatives of a parent?” See Adam at page 357. In Adam,  the prospect of the continued involvement of a third party intruding in this ongoing and reconciled family was determinative. And so it was in this case.

Marriage of Johnson and Johnson, and Walak, Intervenor. 2011 MT 255.

The trial court awarded the home to Husband, but refused to deduct the alleged loan. Affirmed by the Supreme Court.

It may have been possible to argue that the $25,000 in value was separate premarital property in the alternative — but not without a 2006 valuation of the home.

Marriage of Chamberlain, 2011 MT 253

Climbing a crack up Lolo way.

Five months after the Supreme Court had affirmed the trial court’s initial decision, Donald filed a motion to end maintenance. The trial court ultimately granted the motion and this time, Irene appealed. Irene had been awarded 3 lots as part of her division of the marital net worth. At the time of trial, those lots were valued at $225,960. She subsequently sold the lots for $556,000 — approximately $330,000 more than the value at trial. Donald’s income, through no fault of his own, had decreased $1,000 a month. And the sale of the property converted the lots to income-producing property.

The Supreme Court affirmed. Clearly, the division of property in retrospect was not equal by a long shot and there was ample reason, the Court held, to find that continuing to require Donald to pay Irene maintenance was unconscionable.

The decision is In Re Marriage of Crilly, 2009 MT 187.

Also of interest here was the fact that post trial motions of the parties substantially affected the ultimate outcome. The trial court greatly reduced James’ cash payment due Jacqueline. Rarely do post trial motions produce much. Here, clearly the effort was well rewarded, however — for James, at least.

Finally, Jacqueline contended that although the ranch was purchased with proceeds from the sale of James’ premarital property, she was entitled to share in the increase in its value. They bought the ranch for $340,000 and its value at the time of divorce was $660,000 — so serious money was at issue here.

The Supreme Court repeated its earlier standards: that Jacqueline would have to show that she contributed to the preservation or appreciation in value of the ranch and that she would have no entitlement if the increase in value was solely the result of market forces. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on this issue, holding that the trial court had not made any specific findings of fact about Jacqueline’s contribution to the appreciated value of the ranch or whether she acquired any marital interest in the appreciated value.

The case is Marriage of Swanner-Renner 2009 MT 186

Seven months before this couple married, they purchased a home. They bought the home with the husband’s money. They titled the home jointly. They marry. They separate 7 months later. Husband makes all the mortgage payments on the home before and after separation.

The trial court awards the home to husband. Wife appeals claiming the trial court had no jurisdiction to award the home to husband because title was joint and the home was purchased before marriage. Section 40-4-201(1) MCA grants trial courts the power to equitably distribute property “…however and whenever acquired and whether the title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both.”

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that title — in and of itself — does not control the distribution of property in a divorce.

Marriage of Markegard, 2009 MT 152N

“. . . I understand Mr. Webster would like to quit working and certainly understand that, and you’ve worked hard and you’ve worked long, but it sounds like Mrs. Webster is in an increasingly difficult circumstance, and so really what this boils down to in a sense is whether you help pay for her care or whether the taxpayers help pay for her care, and to me, that’s kind of a difficult position to put a Court into. I appreciate the fact that you are willing to try and help out and pay $250 a month. I think what I am going to do is, I’ll cut your obligation in half, to $375 a month. I definitely understand that you have a change in circumstances, and you need some give here, but I also believe that you have an obligation to support your exwife.” See Appellant’s Brief, page 10.

This case concerned an ex-husband wishing to retire and to reduce his maintenance obligation to his fully disabled ex-wife. The Montana Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to the trial court to simply forward its findings and conclusions back to the Supreme Court for review: “Accordingly, we remand this matter to the District Court for entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The District Court shall forward its findings and conclusions to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for our review.” The case was not reversed.